JUDICIAL COMPARISON
of the influence that it had on the decisión .
WHY IS JUDICIAL COMPARISON SPREADING?
Judicial comparison is becoming more widespread for many reasons:
a. Recourse to foreign law is increasingly provided for in national law. This is the case of Section 39 of the South African Constitution: "when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum [....] may consider foreign law"; or the case in which national regulation of conflicts of law provide for the application of the most favourable rule (this requires an examination of foreign law, a comparison between that and local law, and an evaluation of which is more favourable).
b. National legal orders, face similar problems and it is, therefore, expedient to consider foreign law, to seek advice from others who have confronted the same problems, in order to find better solutions (e.g. by evaluating the advantages and/disadvantages of different solutions to a common legal problem): for instance, courts everywhere are engaged in the review of statutes enacted to fight international terrorism, and it is useful for them to make reference to foreign judicial decisions.
c. National legal orders are increasingly bound together in supra-national and in global regulatory regimes, which facilitate the opening up of national legal systems towards each other. 
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WHAT WEIGHT TO ATTACH TO FOREIGN LAW?
How much weight should be attached to foreign law? There are two answers to this question:
a. Foreign law is binding as national law: an example is provided by the "lex alius loci" a principle followed by national courts in Europe throughout the lh lh 17 and 18 centuries: this area was ruled by a "ius commune" (a common law) and, when a provision in a domestic legal order was missing, courts were entitled to use foreign law to fill the "lacuna". This practice came to an end with the codifications of the th 19 century. In this case, foreign law becomes a rule or norm in the "borrowing" legal order, just as it is in the "lending" legal order.
A similar case is that of the "common constitutional traditions" of European countries. The European Court of Justice has frequently referred to these traditions in order to establish some basic common principles (such as the right to a hearing or access to justice), thus helping to make the national legal systems in the European legal space more porous.
b. Foreign law is merely a means of interpretation: given that comparison is a universal method of interpretation, and judges are interpreters of law, judges are of necessity comparatists. Comparison for courts is not, therefore, simply erudition or "soft law"; and nor does it furnish mere influential or persuasive guidelines that require respectful consideration. Rather, it plays the same role as other methods of interpretation.
ARE THERE RULES OF INTERPRETATION BY COMPARISON?
Having ascertained that comparison is a method of judicial interpretation, I want now to turn to the following questions: What makes one court more likely to use this method than another? And should there be at least some basic rules of interpretation by comparison? At the outset, let me make one basic distinction: 
TOWARDS A BETTER JUDICIAL COMPARISON
If the court as interpreter is free to choose foreign law, is it possible to formalize the basis upon which this is done, or this is a field in which cherry-picking must be the rule? To which limits should judicial discretion conform in choosing which foreign law to consider? From this point of view, a few issues are crucial:
a. Which country to choose for comparison? Should a court choose only foreign law of countries which share the same constitutional commitments? Or should comparison also take into account the foreign law of countries that take different approaches, and balance the various solutions?
The answer to this question is simple. A good comparison must not take into account only one or two foreign legal systems, chosen because they belong to the same area or region, or because they share the same values, or simply because they have a common language. A court -like any good comparatist -should consider the various legal "families" and weigh the differing solutions on offer, before arguing that one or more foreign legal systems provides a good example because it is more effective, or because it ensures more benefits, or because it is more congenial to the borrower's legal order.
b. What forms of foreign law should be involved: legislation, judgments, scholarship? As comparison is, at least for our purposes here, the task of courts, should they pay attention only to foreign judgemade law?
Again, the answer is simple. Given that the law generated by legislatures, judges and, indeed, by scholars do not represent self-contained worlds, courts should have recourse to all: to foreign legislation, and to interpretations provided by both judges and law professors. One famous example of this approach is the Supreme Court of Canada's 6 decision on the Quebec secession , i-a-which a variety of statutes, regulations and international treaties, beginning with the "Magna Carta" were considered.
c. Should judicial comparison also take into account the different contexts in which laws apply?
Contrary to the prevailing opinion, national legal systems make use of a growing number of similar legal instruments (think of the "Ombudsman", the notice and comment procedure, the proportionality principie). These legal instruments are, however, applied in different contexts, as history, social values, and national constitutions differ from one country to another. These legal instruments are, however, applied in different contexts, as history, social values, and national constitutions differ from one country to another. These contexts render the legal institutions different: although structurally similar, they are functionally diverse. It is, therefore, crucial to take into account not only the legal institution to be compared, but also the legal environment in which it is applied.
d. How should foreign law be used? It can be used as a source of solutions to common problems, or to strengthen or support a decision, or as a benchmark to evaluate national law.
THE SO-CALLED "LEGITIMACY PROBLEM" OF JUDICIAL COMPARISON
Finally, there is the problem of legitimacy. As democracy tends to "nationalize" the law, borrowing foreign law may appear as a non-democratic move to those who support "legal particularism" and resist the use of foreign ideas. This question has generated much discussion in the US, where, in any "The Court has looked beyond our Nation's borders for support for its conclusions that a particular punishment is cruel and unusual", and that "the Court has treated the law and practices of other nations and international agreements as relevant to the Eighth Amendment not because those norms are binding or controlling but because the judgement of the world's nations that a particular sentencing practice is inconsistent with basic principles of decency demonstrates that the Court's rationale has respected reasoning to support it".
CONCLUSIONS
Much of the literature on judicial comparison examines both the use of supra-national (and global) law and of foreign law, and focuses on the "to do or not to do" question.
This paper has approached the question from a different point of view. It has established a clear dividing line between supra-national and global law on one hand, and foreign domestic law on the other. The first cannot be considered as foreign, as it stems from obligations undertaken by national governments. Supra-national and global law can, however, facilitate the use of foreign domestic law.
Secondly, if judges interpret the (local) law, and if comparison is one of the methods of interpretation, then the right question to ask is not whether judges are entitled to make such comparisons, but rather how they should do so.
